Was in a frenzy from the midnight air that I saw the light: I realized only children can live upon a timeless flight [. . .] All the men are hungry, all the men are in search of time.
Rival theories of time
According to the tensed theory of time, reality is characterized by objective tense determinations of being past, present, and future. On the rival tenseless theory, no such determinations are objective. Rather, they are features of a particular perspective on reality, a reality which is not itself tensed. No events or moments of time are by themselves past, present, or future. They only become so when viewed from a given vantage point in time, t*. They can then be described as being past, present, or future, but what make such descriptions true are the tenseless facts that the events in question occur, respectively, earlier than, simultaneously with, or later than t*. There is nothing special about t*. Any other moment can serve as a focal point of a perspective on other times, because all moments of time and their contents are on the same ontological footing. They tenselessly exist at their respective dates, much like different places and their occupants exist at their respective spatial locations.
The issue between the two rival views-alternatively (but not always correctly, but we gloss over that) labeled the 'A-and B-theories' (following McTaggart), 'dynamic' versus 'static time', 'presentism' versus 'eternalism', 'real time' versus 'spacelike time'-remains central in the flourishing philosophy-of-time industry. William Lane Craig's monumental tetralogy (Craig [2000a,b] , [2001a,b] ) is both a state-of-the-art survey of the entire field and an uncompromising defense of (a version of) the tensed theory. The scope of Craig's study, summarizing (but also going beyond) what he and others have done in the field in the past twenty years or so, is overwhelming and the amount of detail staggering. We venture to say that no single important argument for or against any of the two rival views of time is left unaddressed by Craig and challenge the reader to find such an argument.
1 He traces the evolution of the B-theory from the old 'translation thesis' to the new 'truth-conditions' claim, making the motivations and pressures involved in the transition highly perspicuous. He examines in detail the experience of time and devotes a good fifty pages to McTaggart's paradox. He literally takes the issues of temporal passage and becoming apart. In particular, Craig
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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 However, Craig's discussion of the related issue of persistence (Craig [2000b] , Ch. 9) leaves much to be desired. First, he rejects, without a convincing argument, a combination of endurantism (the view that material objects persist over time by being wholly present at all moments at which they exist) with the tenseless theory of time. This combination is widely accepted on the basis of a predication schema known as adverbialism (see, e.g., Rea [1998] , Balashov [2000] and references therein). This approach solves the problem of temporary intrinsics by insisting that objects have intrinsic properties in ways characterized by temporal modifiers. Craig complains that this requires taking '[t] he apparently complex notion of having a property tly [. . .] as semantically primitive, which to all appearances it is not' ([2000b], p. 191, note 37) . But should a correct semantics be a matter of 'appearances'? This is hardly a reasonable requirement (recall the semantical quandaries of descriptions and propositional attitudes). Craig's critique thus begs the question. Starting with the basic expression 'O is t j', presents, in the second volume, a series of arguments against the minddependence interpretation of becoming and the 'spatializing' of time. In that volume he also explores the connections between the nature of time and the ontology of persistence. Last but not least, he attempts to undermine the B-theorist's reliance on relativity theory by undertaking a comprehensive philosophical study of this theory. We are sure many readers will find most of Craig's central claims controversial, and some of his tactics (e.g., ample use of theological considerations in philosophical argumentation) questionable. But he succeeds, we think, in challenging his opponents. In any event, we feel challenged and are aware of other critical responses, some in print, some still brewing in the works, to various strands in Craig's extended defense of the tensed theory and his assault on its tenseless rival. Needless to say, it is not possible to do Craig's work full justice here. Second, Craig's (unavailing, in our opinion) attack on adverbialism is part of his chapterlong attempt to favor the presentist endurantism solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics over all other candidates. Unfortunately, his discussion does not take into account important recent developments in the 3D/4D debate. In particular, it overlooks a distinction that has emerged within the perdurantism camp, one between the worm theory and the stage theory. The advocates of the latter (see, in particular, Sider [2001] and Hawley [2001] ) have argued that, among other advantages, their theory offers the best unified solution to the paradoxes of material constitution and coincident entities and to the problem of vagueness. Craig's discussion barely touches on the first and practically ignores the second. Since both are now big metaphysical industries, this makes Craig's arguments in the chapter on persistence and his final verdict far from being up-to-date in yet another respect.table the relativistic objection, Craig confronts it head-on. We believe his arguments all fail, but it is not entirely trivial to see why they fail.
Craig's volume-long defense of the neo-Lorentzian interpretation touches on many issues ranging from the history of relativity to scientific methodology to the foundations of spacetime theories. Responding in detail to what Craig has to say on all of these topics would probably require another volume of comparable length. We want to focus on what we think is the central issue. Because of his metaphysical and theological predilections, Craig wants to resurrect the notion of a preferred frame of reference in physics. We want to show-no more and no less-how forcefully the physical evidence militates against such a return to the days before Einstein. We claim (see Section 10 below) that the argument from physics against Craig's metaphysically-motivated proposal is on a par with the argument against proposals to return to the days before Darwin in biology or the days before Copernicus in astronomy.
We want to preface our discussion with a cautionary note on the genre of Craig 2001a. This volume should be looked upon not so much as a 'philosophically-informed introduction to relativity theory' (p. ix; unless otherwise indicated, page references below are to Craig 2001a) but as an exposition of a highly controversial view of this theory by a philosopher who has an active agenda (and much at stake). For this reason, we would not recommend it to a philosophically-minded beginner wanting to learn SR. Such a reader is much better off reading, for instance, Geroch ([1978] ) or Sartori ([1996] ). 3 3 Special relativity: one theory, three interpretations
Craig distinguishes three interpretations of SR: (1) the 'Relativity Interpretation', which is essentially the form in which Einstein ([1905] ) originally presented his theory; (2) the 'Space-Time Interpretation', which is essentially the geometrical interpretation that Minkowski ([1909] ) gave to Einstein's new kinematics; (3) the 'Neo-Lorentzian Interpretation', which is a modernized version of (the relevant parts) of the classical theory of Lorentz ([1915] ) in its final form. We can take the theory itself to be the requirement that all physical laws-or at least all laws effectively governing observable phenomena-be Lorentz invariant. A historian of relativity will have to be more careful, but for our philosophical purposes, as well as for all practical purposes of modern physics, this characterization is perfectly adequate. We also have no trouble with Craig's taxonomy of the theory's interpretations, even though many physicists and philosophers would exclude the neoLorentzian interpretation since it runs counter to the spirit if not the letter of SR by retaining a preferred frame of reference and absolute simultaneity. For us it is Craig's analysis of these three interpretations, and the relation among them, that is problematic.
Theories of principle and constructive theories
What Einstein presented in his 1905 paper is basically-the reason for the qualification will become clear below-what he would later call a 'theory of principle' as opposed to a 'constructive theory' (Einstein [1919] ). Here is our understanding of the distinction. In a theory of principle, one starts from some general, well-confirmed empirical regularities that are raised to the status of postulates (e.g., the impossibility of perpetual motion of the first and the second kind, which became the first and second laws of thermodynamics). With such a theory, one explains the phenomena by showing that they necessarily occur in a world in accordance with the postulates. Whereas theories of principle are about the phenomena, constructive theories aim to get at the underlying reality. In a constructive theory one proposes a (set of) model(s) for some part of physical reality (e.g., the kinetic theory modeling a gas as a swarm of tiny billiard balls bouncing around in a box). One explains the phenomena by showing that the theory provides a model that gives an empirically adequate description of the salient features of reality.
Consider the phenomenon of length contraction. Understood purely as a theory of principle, SR explains this phenomenon if it can be shown that the phenomenon necessarily occurs in any world that is in accordance with the relativity postulate and the light postulate. By its very nature such a theoryof-principle explanation will have nothing to say about the reality behind the phenomenon. A constructive version of the theory, by contrast, explains length contraction if the theory provides an empirically adequate model of the relevant features of a world in accordance with the two postulates. Such constructive-theory explanations do tell us how to conceive of the reality behind the phenomenon.
Both the space-time interpretation and the neo-Lorentzian interpretation provide constructive-theory explanations. In the space-time interpretation, the model is Minkowski space-time and length contraction is explained by showing that two observers who are in relative motion to one another and therefore use different sets of space-time axes disagree about which crosssections of the 'world-tube' of a physical system give the length of the system. In the neo-Lorentzian interpretation, length contraction is explained as a combination of dynamical effects and artifacts of measurement. We shall examine this explanation in more detail below.
As long as we view SR strictly as a theory of principle in the sense in which it was defined above, there are no grounds for preferring one constructivetheory explanation over another. Einstein's theory, however, was not purely a theory of principle. In the 'Kinematical Part' of the 1905 paper, Einstein made it clear that he saw the effects derived from the postulates as manifestations of a new kinematics. So despite Einstein's initial misgivings about Minkowski's ideas and their mathematical expression, the space-time explanation of phenomena such as length contraction is completely in the spirit of Einstein's theory, whereas the neo-Lorentzian explanation is not. One of us has argued (Janssen [1995] , section 4.3.1; [2002] ) that Lorentz himself was able to reconcile his own theory with SR by looking upon the latter strictly as a theory of principle.
The relativity interpretation: explanatorily deficient?
In this section and the next, we respond to Craig's objections to the relativity interpretation. Craig writes: 'the relativity interpretation of SR with its pluralistic ontology and contracted and retarded three-dimensional continuants, is fantastic and explanatorily impoverished' (p. 102). We shall deal with the 'fragmented-ontology' objection and the 'explanatory-deficiency' objection in turn.
The explanatory-deficiency charge has two counts. (i) SR in its 1905 form fails to provide a theory-of-principle explanation of phenomena such as length contraction.
(ii) Theory-of-principle explanations in general are deficient. We begin with (ii). First, we note that theory-of-principle explanations appear to fit the once-standard covering law model of explanation much better than constructive-theory explanations. That, however, might just be another nail in the coffin of the covering law model. More importantly, we want to emphasize that (ii) also applies to thermodynamics. That in and of itself, we submit, places the relativity interpretation in very good company.
Having said this, we must grant Craig that Einstein himself appears to have thought that theories of principle are inferior to constructive theories. If this is so, one may ask why he settled for a theory of principle in 1905. The answer can be found in an oft-quoted passage from Einstein's autobiographical notes:
By and by I despaired of the possibility of discovering the true laws by means of constructive efforts based on known facts. The longer and more despairingly I tried, the more I came to the conviction that only the discovery of a universal formal principle could lead us to assured results. The example I saw before me was thermodynamics. (Einstein [1949] , p. 53)
Einstein settled for a theory of principle because he was confident that the two postulates on which he built his theory would survive the quantum revolution he saw coming. This brings us to another remark by Craig: 'As a theory of principle rather than a constructive theory, Einstein's SR is based on postulates which are characterized by their very non-empirical character' (p. 181). In fact, like the first and second laws of thermodynamics, Einstein's two postulates rest on a wealth of empirical evidence. The relativity postulate was supported by nearly a century's worth of failed attempts to detect the earth's motion with respect to the ether (see, e.g., Janssen and Stachel, [forthcoming] ). Einstein did not cite any empirical support for the light postulate in the 1905 paper. But in Einstein ([1911] , p. 6) and in many subsequent expositions of SR, he made it clear that he saw the light postulate as the secure core of classical electrodynamics. So, indirectly, the light postulate is supported by all the evidence amassed during the 19th century in favor of that powerful theory.
We now turn to count (i) of Craig's explanatory-deficiency charge, which seems to be the upshot of Craig's discussion (pp. 27-42) of the alleged conventionality of simultaneity in SR. Neither length contraction nor the Lorentz transformation equations for the space and time coordinates can be derived solely from the postulates. One also needs the appropriate assumptions about the homogeneity and isotropy of space and time (explicitly identified in the 1905 paper and routinely granted) and the Einstein-Poincare´convention for synchronizing distant clocks. Consider two clocks A and B at some distance from one another at rest in some frame S. When A reads t 1 , a light signal is sent to B. The signal arrives at B when B reads t 2 , and is reflected back to A where it arrives when A reads t 3 . A and B are said to be properly synchronized in S if and only if
First of all, we want to emphasize that the use of light signals is by no means essential to define simultaneity in any one frame. They could be replaced by bullets fired from A to B and from B to A by identical guns at A and B. We cannot use bullets, however, to establish the relativity of simultaneity until we have established how their velocities transform in a world in accordance with the postulates. Light is the only signal for which the postulates tell us how its velocity transforms. So we introduce the concept of simultaneity in terms of the light-signaling method, use the result-along with two further consequences of the postulates, length contraction and time dilation-to establish the transformation rule for arbitrary velocities in a relativistic world, and then verify that it makes no difference whether we use light signals or bullets moving with subluminal or even superluminal velocities to synchronize clocks.
What is at issue in the debate over the conventionality of simultaneity is whether the definition of simultaneity involving the Einstein-Poincare´light-signaling method is not just based on an arbitrary choice of 0 < e < 1 in the expression t 2 ¼ t 1 þ eðt 3 À t 1 Þ. As Craig reports, Malament (1977) showed (or claimed to have shown 5 ) that the standard definition, based on e ¼ 1 2
, is the only (nontrivial) simultaneity (equivalence) relation that can be defined completely in terms of the causal structure of Minkowski space-time and an observer's world line. Craig grants that, given Minkowski space-time, the standard definition is unique, but, he writes, 'to justify the definition [. . .] by appealing to the metric of relativistic space-time would plainly be questionbegging' (p. 35; see also p. 42).
The problem is much more benign than Craig makes it sound. First, Craig's objection loses much of its force when we recognize the space-time interpretation as a constructive theory complementing the theory-of-principletype relativity interpretation rather than as one of its rivals. We could then simply concede that a rigorous argument proving the uniqueness of the standard definition of simultaneity had to wait for the development of the space-time interpretation. Or we could try to rewrite Malament's argument for the uniqueness of the standard definition of simultaneity in terms of the relativity interpretation. We do not even have to concede or do that much. We can justify the standard definition without appealing to Minkowski space-time. Making the appropriate assumptions about homogeneity and isotropy, we demand that e be chosen in such a way that the velocity of light moving from A to B comes out to be equal to the velocity of light moving from B to A.
6 The standard objection to this line of reasoning is that the oneway velocity of light can not be defined in the absence of a definition of simultaneity. But for the purpose of defining simultaneity, a necessary condition for any acceptable definition of velocity suffices. Making the assumptions of homogeneity and isotropy, in turn, suffices to justify that condition: 7 equal distances traveled at the same velocity should take equal times.
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In short, Craig's explanatory-deficiency objection fails on both counts. The explanations given by the relativity interpretation are (a) as good as the theoryof-principle explanations of thermodynamics and (b) independent of the spacetime interpretation (not that (b) matters much from our point of view).
6 The relativity interpretation: ontologically fragmented?
It is part of the nature of theories of principle that they avoid ontological commitments as much as possible. Craig nonetheless claims that the relativity interpretation is committed to an ontology of ordinary three-dimensional objects with definite length, width, and height. Since these properties are frame-dependent, Craig claims that the relativity interpretation leads to what he calls the 'fragmentation of reality' (p. 104). These charges are unfounded. To borrow a phrase from Norton ([1999] ), Einstein follows a 'subtractive' strategy in his 1905 paper. He certainly discusses ordinary three-dimensional objects, but the point of that discussion is to show that many properties which such objects have intrinsically in the classical world (such as their length) become frame-dependent in a world in accordance with the postulates of relativity theory. Rather than endorsing an ontology of three-dimensional objects, Einstein actually strips such objects of many of their classical properties.
Einstein's usage of a 'subtractive' strategy shows how close the relativity interpretation is to Minkowski's version of the space-time interpretation. In modern texts (e.g., Earman [1989] ), space-time theories are formulated following what Norton ([1999] ) calls the 'additive' strategy. In this approach, which goes back to Riemann, one starts with a bare manifold and then adds geometrical structure, for example, a metric or an affine connection. Minkowski, by contrast, worked in the tradition of the Erlangen Program of Felix , pp. 411ff.). In this approach, geometries are characterized in terms of invariants of transformation groups associated with them. Reality is denied to all elements not invariant under the relevant group of transformations. In the case of SR, this group is the Lorentz group. So Minkowski, like Einstein, followed a 'subtractive' strategy. Minkowski ([1909] , p. 83) even suggested changing the name 'relativity postulate' to 'postulate of the absolute [four-dimensional] world' to put more emphasis on the new relativistic ontology instead of on the discarded-relative or framedependent-elements of the old ontology. Felix Klein ([1910] , p. 539) likewise suggested that the relativity theory might as well be called the 'invariance theory' (of the Lorentz group). Einstein agreed (see Holton and Elkana [1997] , p. xv), but neither suggestion caught on.
The space-time interpretation: does God need a preferred frame of reference?
We have only a few points to add to what has already been said about the space-time interpretation. grants that this interpretation does explain things like length contraction, and he shows very clearly how. His central objection to the space-time interpretation is that it is incompatible with a preferred frame of reference, which, he claims, is a necessary condition for the existence of God (see conditionals (1)-(4) on p. 173). Such theological considerations lead Craig to embrace the neo-Lorentzian interpretation. We are not theologians and shall not comment on the argument that gets Craig from God to preferred frames of reference. We just want to present what we consider to be a very strong physical argument developed by one of us (MJ) for preferring the space-time interpretation over the neo-Lorentzian interpretation. For Craig, presumably, anything short of an a priori argument for this preference would be outweighed by his theological argument. Alas, we only have an inductive argument to offer, albeit it one of the potent common-cause variety. Craig is not alone in rejecting the conclusion of this argument. He quotes several philosophers of quantum mechanics, John Bell and James Cushing among them (Craig [2001a] , pp. 226ff.), who have argued that the interpretational difficulties with quantum mechanics may call for a neo-Lorentzian interpretation of SR.
8
Before we can present our counter-argument, we need to get clear on what exactly the neo-Lorentzian interpretation involves.
The neo-Lorentzian interpretation: at what price?
Following Zahar ([1973] ), Craig (p. 14) bases his discussion of the neoLorentzian interpretation on the so-called 'doubly-amended theory', a simplified model of Lorentz's mature theory due to Gru¨nbaum ([1973] , p. 723). The doubly-amended theory consists of the core of Lorentz's theory-Newtonian mechanics and (Lorentz's version of) Maxwellian electrodynamics-plus two special assumptions: the contraction hypothesis and the clock retardation hypothesis. Gru¨nbaum introduced this toy-model to show that these two hypotheses can be added to the core of Lorentz's theory without rendering the theory non-falsifiable. The model is perfectly adequate for this purpose, but it is woefully inadequate for Craig's more ambitious goals.
The problem is that it takes a good deal more than Gru¨nbaum's two amendments to turn Lorentz's core theory into a theory that provides an empirically adequate model of a world in accordance with the postulates of SR. We cannot even derive the Lorentz transformation equations for the space and time coordinates from the doubly-amended theory alone. We need to add the Einstein-Poincare´synchronization convention, and this time it is absolutely crucial that the synchronization be done with light signals. As a result of this convention, clocks in a frame in motion with respect to the privileged frame synchronized by a co-moving observer will not read the true time of the privileged frame but the Lorentz-transformed time of the moving frame.
The Einstein-Poincare´convention is an odd one to adopt in the doublyamended theory. The theory predicts that if the light signals were replaced by bullets, clocks would be synchronized according to the true time. After all, according to Newtonian kinematics, which is part of the doubly-amended theory, a bullet moving from clock A to clock B will have the same velocity as one moving from B to A in the frame in which both the two clocks and the two guns used to fire the bullets are at rest. Light, however, only has the same velocity c in all directions in the privileged frame. (The theory's two amendments only ensure that the measured two-way velocity of light is c in all directions in all inertial frames.) Why would a proponent of the doublyamended theory prefer the light-signaling method which does not synchronize clocks according to the true time over the bullet-signaling method which does, at least according to his own theory? The only justification we can think of is to invoke effective Lorentz invariance. But is not the goal of this whole enterprise to argue that one can make Lorentz's core theory compatible with SR (i.e., that we can render it effectively Lorentz invariant) by adding just a few extra assumptions? If effective Lorentz invariance is simply going to be assumed at some point in this operation, we might as well assume it right from the start, in which case there is no need for Gru¨nbaum's two special amendments either.
We reiterate that the empirical viability of the neo-Lorentzian interpretation hinges on its ability to provide a concrete model of a world in accordance with Einstein's two postulates. In such a world, the results of the bulletsignaling synchronization procedure will agree with those of the lightsignaling procedure. So not only does the proponent of the doubly-amended theory have no justification for his synchronization convention; his theory, as it stands, is simply not viable empirically. What is needed is a third amendment, and then some.
The Lorentz transformation equations for the space and time coordinates encode three deviations from the Galilean transformation equations: relativity of simultaneity, length contraction, and time dilation. In order to account for the last two effects, Gru¨nbaum's two amendments were added to Lorentz's core theory as exceptions to the rule that the spatio-temporal behavior of all systems is the standard spatio-temporal behavior of Newtonian kinematics. The third amendment decrees a similar exception to account for the first effect. The Newtonian norm is that, in any inertial frame, two events that occur simultaneously in different parts of some physical system at rest also occur simultaneously when that same system is in uniform motion. The third amendment to Lorentz's core theory says that, contrary to this Newtonian norm (but in accordance with the relativistic norm), two events occurring simultaneously in different parts of a system at rest in the privileged frame will occur one after the other if the same system is moving with respect to the privileged frame, the event occurring closest to the rear end of the moving system occurring first. Unless one simply invokes effective Lorentz invariance, which seems to defeat the purpose of the whole game, the third amendment sounds far more outlandish than either the length contraction or the clock retardation hypothesis. Once accepted, however, it does provide a rationale for the Einstein-Poincare´convention for clock synchronization. It also guarantees that the bullet-signaling method for clock synchronization gives the same results as the light-signaling method.
The now triply-amended theory, however, is still not compatible with SR. The three amendments only guarantee that proponents of the two theories will agree upon the basic transformation equations for the space and time coordinates. To prove compatibility it must be shown that the triplyamended theory 'only allows systems and processes described in terms of such coordinates that also are allowed by special relativity' (Janssen [2002, p. 435] ). To achieve this, it must be assumed that the laws effectively governing all physical systems are Lorentz invariant.
9 Needless to say, the contraction hypothesis and the clock retardation hypothesis are Mickey Mouse compared to this broad assumption of effective Lorentz invariance. Craig's substitution of the toy-model for the theory itself suggests that the contraction hypothesis and clock retardation hypothesis are all it takes to produce a neo-Lorentzian interpretation of SR. It actually takes a lot more.
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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 9 On the face of it, there appears to be another way to achieve compatibility with SR in one fell swoop. One could add a fourth amendment to the effect that all physical observations can ultimately be reduced to observations of positions and times. To justify that amendment one could cite the famous 'point-coincidence argument' (Einstein [1916] , p. 117). Even so, one would presumably want to add more theoretical structure. Trying to rewrite all statements of the quadruply-amended theory in terms of statements about space-time coincidences comes dangerously close to replacing that theory by its 'Craig-system' or its 'Ramsey-sentence', a
We should emphasize that the problems discussed above are problems for the doubly-amended theory, the toy-model of Lorentz's theory, not for the theory that Lorentz ([1915] ) himself held. Not that this will be of any comfort to Craig: we shall see that a neo-Lorentzian interpretation along the lines of Lorentz's actual theory still faces debilitating problems. To bring out those problems we need a more accurate model of Lorentz's theory. 10 In modern terms (and glossing over details irrelevant to the present discussion), Lorentz was able to prove the Lorentz invariance of the free Maxwell equations and realized that he could use this result (called the 'theorem of corresponding states') to predict negative outcomes in a broad class of experiments aimed at detecting the earth's motion through the ether by adopting a far-reaching generalization of the physical hypothesis he had originally introduced to account for the Michelson-Morley experiment. In modern terms, this bold new hypothesis (dubbed the 'generalized contraction hypothesis' in Janssen [1995] ) states that the laws effectively governing all forms of matter are Lorentz invariant, just as the equations governing the fields interacting with it are. This hypothesis entails the amendments of the triply-amended theory, the relativistic velocity dependence of inertia, and much more. Yet, as bold as it is, Lorentz's theory provided a good rationale for adopting the generalized contraction hypothesis. And since the hypothesis trivially renders the theory effectively Lorentz invariant, it does provide a basis for an empirically viable neo-Lorentzian interpretation of SR. The explanatory deficiencies of such an interpretation, however, are staggering.
The neo-Lorentzian interpretation: with what pay-off?
Craig seems to imply that when it comes to explanatory power, there is essentially a tie between the neo-Lorentzian interpretation and the space-time interpretation. In this he is mistaken in our view, although several quotations in his book make it clear that it is a common mistake. We are certainly not the first ones to correct it. In fact, Craig (p. 99) quotes a passage in which strategy known to be fatally flawed (Hempel [1965] , section 9). Einstein, of course, never intended to use the point-coincidence argument in this manner. Even on a naı¨ve positivistic reading (see, however, Howard [1999] ), the argument only states that the empirical content of the theory is exhausted by the set of point coincidences. That does not prohibit one from introducing additional theoretical structure. But if one allows extra theoretical structure in the quadruply-amended theory, one would have to trade in all Galilean-invariant structures of Lorentz's core theory for Lorentz-invariant structures of SR in its four-dimensional formulation. E.g., Lorentz, in effect, replaced classical mechanics by relativistic mechanics in his theory. So, this approach eventually just leads us back to the assumption of effective Lorentz invariance. 10 One of us (MJ) has developed such a model in detail in several places (see Janssen [1995] , [2002] ; Janssen and Stachel [forthcoming] ). This work was begun under the supervision of Lorentz expert A. J. Kox, whose name is spelled 'Knox' in Craig's book, an unfortunate slip for a book dedicated to Lorentz (and to three neo-Lorentzians).
Gru¨nbaum clearly explains the nature of the mistake. The point, however, bears repeating. What is there to explain about phenomena such as length contraction and time dilation? Using the notion of 'contrast classes ' (van Fraassen [1980] , section 5.2.8), we can formulate the why-question that we suspect lies behind the demand for an explanation: why is a rod in motion shorter than a rod at rest rather than equally long? For those who share the Newtonian presupposition implicit in this why-question, the neo-Lorentzian interpretation provides a very satisfactory answer to this question. Contrary to what one would expect in Newtonian theory, the forces holding the rod together are not Galilean invariant but Lorentz invariant. As a consequence, the equilibrium state of a rod in motion with respect to the privileged frame is shorter than the equilibrium state of a rod at rest. For co-moving observers, however, it will appear to be the other way around since their clocks will not read the true time of the privileged frame but the Lorentz-transformed time of the moving frame (Dorling [1968] ). For those who do not share the Newtonian presupposition of the why-question, this answer completely misses the mark. Instead, such a person would simply point out that the presupposition is wrong. There is no a priori reason to think that space and time will be Newtonian. In fact, the universality of the behavior of the rod (i.e., any physical system whatsoever will exhibit the exact same contraction) suggests that space and time are Minkowskian. Length contraction is part of the normal spatio-temporal behavior of systems in Minkowski space-time. There is nothing further to explain.
An example from ordinary three-dimensional geometry may help here. Suppose one night Roxanne comes down from her balcony and spots Cyrano. As Cyrano turns around to run off, Roxanne sees his nose, protruding from his silhouette against the night sky, become more and more pronounced until eventually she sees it get smaller and smaller again and vanish. This behavior of Cyrano's nose is part of the normal spatial behavior of objects in three-dimensional Euclidean space and does not seem to call for any further explanation-the demand for an explanation would only arise if the length of the nose of the silhouette did not change! Now it is true that for Cyrano's nose to behave the way it does, it is necessary that the forces holding it together are invariant under spatial rotation. The question is what explains what. Does the Euclidean nature of space explain why the forces holding Cyrano's nose together are invariant under rotation or the other way around? Likewise, does the Minkowskian nature of space-time explain why the forces holding a rod together are Lorentz invariant or the other way around? Our intuition is that the geometrical structure of space(-time) is the explanans here and the invariance of the forces the explanandum. To switch things around, our intuition tells us, is putting the cart before the horse. Some readers may not share this intuition. 11 We ask such readers to read on.
10 Why we should prefer the space-time interpretation over the neo-Lorentzian interpretation
There is a better way, we think, for arguing for the explanatory advantage of the space-time interpretation over the neo-Lorentzian interpretation (Janssen [1995] , [2002] ). Compare the status of Lorentz invariance in the two interpretations. In the former, Lorentz invariance reflects the structure of the space-time posited by the theory. In the latter, Lorentz invariance is a property accidentally shared by all laws effectively governing systems in Newtonian space and time. As a result, the neo-Lorentzian interpretation violates the symmetry principles of Earman ([1989] , p. 46), which state that every symmetry of the space-time posited by a theory should be a symmetry of that theory's dynamical laws and vice versa. These principles are called 'SP1' and 'SP2', respectively. Galilean transformations correspond to symmetries of the space-time posited by the neo-Lorentzian interpretation, but not to symmetries of the theory's dynamical laws (i.e., SP1 fails). Lorentz transformations correspond to symmetries of the dynamical laws in the neoLorentzian interpretation, but not to symmetries of its space-time (i.e., SP2 fails). Earman's justification for these principles is that they 'provide standards for judging when the laws and the space-time structure are appropriate to one another' (Earman [1989] , p. 46). What happens when they are not, especially when there is a competing theory in which they are? This is where the argument we alluded to above comes in. 12 In the neoLorentzian interpretation it is, in the final analysis, an unexplained coincidence that the laws effectively governing different sorts of matter all share the property of Lorentz invariance, which originally appeared to be nothing but a peculiarity of the laws governing electromagnetic fields. In the space-time interpretation this coincidence is explained by tracing the Lorentz
Critical Notice: Presentism and Relativity 341 11 E.g., Dieks ([1984] ), quoted by Craig (p. 100), seems to be based on the opposite intuition. We suspect that many relationists share Dieks's intuition. Since the invariance group (Lorentzian or Galilean) of the dynamical laws essentially is the space-time structure for a relationist, the (effective) Lorentz invariance of the dynamical laws in a sense does seem to explain for a relationist why the (effective) space-time structure is Minkowskian. Such an explanation, of course, does not amount to an explanation of why the space-time structure is Minkowskian rather than Newtonian, unless the relationist has some a priori reason to expect the structure of space and time to be Newtonian. Nor does it interchange the roles of explanans and explanandum in our Cyrano-and-Roxanne example. The behavior of Cyrano's nose is just an instance of the normal spatio-temporal behavior of objects in Minkowski space-time, no matter whether one is a substantivalist or a relationist about the ontology of space(-time). The explanatory considerations in the text are therefore largely independent of one's stance on the ontology of space(-time). 12 The argument was inspired by the reconstruction of Perrin's argument for molecular reality as a common-cause argument in Salmon ([1984] , pp. 213-21).
invariance of all these different laws to a common origin: the space-time structure posited in this interpretation (Janssen [1995] , [2002] ).
13
The argument can be made in different ways. Einstein made it in the opening paragraph of the 1905 paper with the help of his famous magnetconductor example: for the current measured in the conductor, only the relative motion of magnet and conductor matters; but in Lorentz's theory the case with the magnet at rest is very different from the case with the conductor at rest. No matter how the argument is made, the point is that there are brute facts in the neo-Lorentzian interpretation that are explained in the space-time interpretation. As Craig (p. 101) writes (in a different context): 'if what is simply a brute fact in one theory can be given an explanation in another theory, then we have an increase in intelligibility that counts in favor of the second theory.' We just presented such an argument in the case of the spacetime interpretation versus the neo-Lorentzian interpretation. The argument is not iron-clad and may still be outweighed by the needs of theology or quantum mechanics. But it is on a par with, say, the argument for preferring Darwinian evolution over special creation. That is good enough for us.
What about general relativity?
Does the A-theory fare any better in general relativity (GR)? Like other Atheorists, Craig argues that the cosmological time of some relativistic models of the universe can be used to support the tensed theory. Apart from the fact that the connection between the absolute time of neo-Lorentzian theories and the cosmic time is unclear, the notion of the latter itself is not robust enough to identify it (as Craig does) with 'metaphysical time' appropriate for presentism. First, uniform cosmic time is a feature only of idealized (homogeneous and isotropic) cosmological models. Second, the notion of cosmic time originates, not from the nomological framework of GR, but from the contingent boundary conditions imposed on it. Finally, before one obtains such a notion, one still starts with the four-dimensional space-time manifold, whose essential role is hard to square with the ontological requirements of presentism.
14 It is true that, mainly as a result of recent work on the so-called 'hole argument' (see, e.g., Earman [1989] , Ch. 9), the ontological status of the manifold in GR has been called into question. The hole argument seems to suggest that the manifold is not a substance, but should be thought of in relational terms. We shall not pursue the possible ramifications of these developments for the issues under discussion here. General relativistic space-time is a complex subject and Craig invokes it only briefly. We therefore restrict ourselves to these brief remarks.
12 Squaring the tenseless space-time interpretation with our tensed experience
We have argued that relativity theory-and the physical evidence supporting it-point strongly in the direction of the tenseless B-theory of time.
Metaphysicians of time sensitive to scientific evidence thus have their work cut out for them. We suspect that, when pressed on the issue, the average physicist will do no better than Hermann Weyl in trying to reconcile the tenseless world of relativity with our tensed experience: 'The objective world simply is, it does not happen. Only to the gaze of my consciousness, crawling upward along the life line of my body, does a section of this world come to life as a fleeting image in space which continuously changes in time' (Weyl [1949] , p. 116; 15 cf. Weyl [1922] , p. 217). Einstein may have articulated the poor man's view on these matters best when he wrote three weeks before his death (Fo¨lsing [1997] , p. 741): 'To us believing physicists the distinction between past, present, and future has only the significance of a stubborn illusion.' As we hope to have shown, Craig fails completely in his attempt to make the case that we should trade in the standard space-time interpretation of SR for the neo-Lorentzian interpretation, but his work on the metaphysics of time forcefully reminds us of the challenge to improve on Weyl's account of the 'stubborn illusion' referred to by Einstein.
